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Abstract—Numerous techniques exist for conducting 
computer-assisted formal verification and validation. The cost 
associated with these techniques varies, depending on factors 
such as ease of use, the effort required to construct correct 
requirement specifications for complex real-life properties, and 
the effort associated with instrumentation of the software under 
test.  Likewise, existing techniques differ in their ability to 
effectively cover the system under test and its associated 
requirements. To aid software engineers in selecting the 
appropriate technique for the formal verification and validation 
task at hand, we introduce a three-dimension tradeoff space 
encompassing both cost and coverage. 
 
Index Terms—Software Verification and Validation, Formal 
Methods, Model Checking, Assertion Checkers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many real-world examples of the impact of 
software-related failures on our lives, such as the 
malfunctioning of the Miele G885 SC dishwasher, worldwide 
recall of the BMW 745i sedan, the temporary closure of 
Southern California’s airspace while air traffic controllers had 
no access to digital displays of terrain and airspace 
boundaries, the loss of an Ariane 5 rocket and its payload of 
satellites, and the loss of life due to friendly fire by the Patriot 
missile system. Software is ubiquitous, and software errors 
affect everybody. A study conduct in 2001 and sponsored by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
found that the annual cost of software errors to the U.S. 
economy is approximately $59.5 billion, which in 2001 was 
about 0.6 percent of the gross domestic product [1].  
The ever increasing demand for highly automated high-
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integrity reactive systems, such as those used in defense 
(target-tracking system), healthcare (e.g., infusion pump), and 
transportation (e.g., traction-control system in an automobile), 
pushes the complexity of embedded systems to new heights. 
By high-integrity, we mean systems for which the customer or 
other stakeholder requires a high level of assurance be 
demonstrated before placing these systems into operation. 
Reactive systems, under the control of their embedded 
software, must interact closely with other embedded systems 
and adhere to tight constraints on both timing and control. 
Their close interaction with the environment makes the 
understanding and satisfaction of embedded systems’ 
functional requirements (i.e., “what the software must do”) 
and their safety requirements (i.e., “what the software must 
not do”) a high priority.  
The activities for assuring the correctness of reactive 
systems reside within the Verification and Validation (V&V) 
process. According to the Guide to the Software Engineering 
Body of Knowledge [2],   
The V&V process determines whether or not 
products of a given development or maintenance 
activity conform to the requirement of that activity, 
and whether or not the final software product fulfills 
its intended purpose and meets user requirements. 
Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is 
built correctly, in the sense that the output products 
of an activity meet the specifications imposed on 
them in previous activities. Validation is an attempt 
to ensure that the right product is built, that is, the 
product fulfills its specific intended purpose. 
V&V traditionally relies on manual examination of 
software requirements and design artifacts in addition to the 
testing of target code. As software-intensive systems have 
become increasingly complex, traditional V&V techniques are 
now inadequate for use in locating subtle errors in the 
software. For example, there are intricate and abstruse system 
behaviors that are only observable at runtime and at such a 
fine level of granularity of time that human intervention at 
runtime is not practical; software automation holds the key to 
V&V of these types of system behaviors.  
Lutz pointed out, in her study of the software errors 
discovered during the integration and testing phase of the 
Voyager and Galileo spacecraft, that the majority of the 
program faults were functional faults, and a large percentage 
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of the functional faults were behavioral faults (50% of the 
safety-related, functional faults in Voyager and 38% of safety-
related, functional faults in Galileo) [3]. Lutz’s finding 
highlights the difficulties in understanding and implementing 
behavioral requirements correctly. We divide the system 
behaviors into two classes: 
1) Logical behavior - This class describes the cause and 
effect of a computation, typically represented as 
functional requirements of a system. For example, given 
two positive numbers x and e, the output of the square 
root function sqrt(x) must satisfy the requirement:  
| x – sqrt(x) * sqrt(x) | < e. 
2) Sequencing behavior – This class describes behaviors as 
sequences of events, conditions, and constraints on data 
values and timing. In its vanilla form, sequencing 
behavior specifies sets of legal and illegal sequences, 
such as the following automotive body-logic requirement: 
Once engine is turned off, compartment lights must 
be on until driver door is opened. 
Sequencing behavior has two types of common constraints: 
1) Timing constraints – describe the timely start and/or 
termination of successful or forbidden computations, such 
as the deadline of a periodic computation or the maximum 
response time of an event handler. For example, 
The sqrt() function must complete its computation and 
return an answer within 200 milliseconds from the time it 
is called. 
2) Time-series constraints – describe the timely execution of 
a sequence of computations within a specific duration of 
time. For example,  
Whenever the system load (L) exceeds 75% of the 
MaxLoad, L must be reduced back to 50% of the 
MaxLoad within 1 minute and must remain at or below 
60% of the MaxLoad for at least 10 minutes. 
Sequencing behaviors with time-series constraints are the 
most difficult to understand, specify, and implement correctly. 
We need automated V&V techniques to assure the correctness 
of both logical and sequencing behaviors. Automated tools for 
conducting V&V take as input system behaviors and 
properties specified in a mechanically processable formal 
specification. 
Webster’s Dictionary defines formal as “definite, orderly, 
and methodical.”  The term “formal methods” refers to the 
software development activities (e.g., requirements analysis, 
software design, program transformation, and testing) that 
employ mathematically based techniques for describing, 
reasoning about, and realizing system properties, which are 
expressed using formal languages. 
It is widely claimed that formal methods help improve the 
quality of software [4], [5]. Formal methods have received 
considerable academic attention during the last three decades, 
as reflected by the many technical papers published in the 
open literature. (For example, IEEE Software (Sept. 1990), 
IEEE Computer (Sept. 1990), and IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering (Sept. 1990, May 1997, Aug. 2000) all 
have published special issues on formal methods.) In the 1993 
seminal study of industrial application of formal methods, 
Craigen, Gerhart and Ralston [6] reported that 
Formal methods are maturing in terms of: 
• The range of applications for exploratory, regulatory, 
and commercial use; 
• The solution to technical problems inhibiting larger 
scale use; 
• The understanding of nontechnical barriers to wider 
spread use; and 
• The standardization of concepts and notations.   
However, wide use of formal methods in industry and 
government, even for use in safety-critical commercial and 
defense applications, has failed to materialize in the past 
thirteen years [7]. One reason for this lackluster adoption of 
formal methods is that software development is a multi-
facetted process, with each phase of the process having its 
own unique set of challenges, and there is a lack of a clear and 
common understanding about the effectiveness of the 
spectrum of formal methods in different phases of the 
software development process. In the past, people have been 
positioning and teaching different classes of formal V&V 
(FV&V) techniques in isolation, causing confusion in the 
market – people seeing a myriad of techniques with no 
uniform way to compare them.   
In this article, we present a visual tradeoff space we 
developed for the NASA IV&V Facility, called the FV&V 
tradeoff cuboid, for software engineers to discuss the various 
tradeoffs (e.g. cost, coverage, etc.) between different FV&V 
approaches in order to select the appropriate techniques for 
the FV&V of high-integrity software-intensive systems, many 
of which are reactive systems with complex sequencing 
behaviors. The rest of the article is organized as follows. We 
first discuss the different needs for the FV&V techniques in 
the different phases of the software process in Section II, 
followed by a description of the three-dimensional FV&V 
tradeoff space in Section III. We then illustrate the use of the 
tradeoff space with a qualitative comparison of three classes 
of FV&V techniques for reactive system behaviors in Section 
IV and present a sample application of the tradeoff space in 
Section V. We conclude the paper with a discussion on how 
the tradeoff space can be used as an aid by software engineers 
for selecting the appropriate technique for the FV&V task at 
hand.  
II. THE V&V REQUIREMENTS IN THE SOFTWARE LIFE 
CYCLE 
One can view software development as a set of 
transformations via the following workflows: requirements 
specification, design, and implementation. Depending on the 
software process model, these transformations may be carried 
out in a sequential order (as in the Waterfall [8], or the Spiral 
processes [9]), or in an iterative and incremental fashion (as in 
the Unified process [10]). Table 1 shows the input/output of 
each transformation and the corresponding V&V activities. 
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We need to separate the FV&V techniques into two 
categories: the FV&V for the Requirements phase and the 
FV&V for the Design/Implementation phase. The FV&V 
techniques for the Requirements phase are formal validation 
techniques. These techniques must allow stakeholders to 
capture and test the formal requirements (e.g., via simulations) 
to ensure that the developer’s cognitive understanding of the 
requirements matches the formal specifications. The FV&V 
techniques for the Design/Implementation phase are formal 
verification techniques. These techniques must aid developers 
in demonstrating that their software satisfies the requirements 
(functional and non-functional), and should effectively locate 
and explain the cause of errors in faulty design and code. 
III. THE FV&V DIMENSIONS 
Let us return to our discussion of the dimensions of the 
FV&V tradeoff space, which is made up of the following 
three dimensions: specification/validation, program/ 
implementation, and verification. 
A. The specification/validation dimension 
The specification/validation dimension represents the cost, 
effort and effectiveness associated with formal specification. 
Formal requirements specification is the process of capturing 
requirements and properties for the domain of discourse (e.g., 
component, module, or system being designed or inspected) in 
a machine interpretable or executable form. Clark et al. 
reported in [4] that the process of specifying requirements 
formally enables developers to gain “a deeper understanding 
of the system being specified,” and to “uncover requirements 
flaws, inconsistencies, ambiguities and incompletenesses.”  In 
addition, the artifacts produced by enacting the process “can 
itself be formally analyzed,” thus allowing the possibility for 
some degree of automation of V&V tasks. The formal 
specifications describe what any system that solves the real-
world problem ought to do. Typically, formal specifications 
are created from conceptual requirements as understood by the 
primary modeler. Regardless of what formal notations or 
formal methods were used, the system modelers always start 
their requirements-discovery process based on some scenarios 
involving the system and its environment, express their 
understanding of the expected behavior or properties of the 
system informally with natural languages, and then translate 
the natural language requirements into formal specifications.  
The specification/validation dimension deals with the ease 
of writing formal specifications and getting them right, that is, 
getting them to represent the cognitive intent the human owner 
has for this requirement.  This dimension measures cost and 
coverage. Cost is the fiscal cost of creating and validating 
correct representative formal specifications for desired 
properties. Coverage is the degree to which a given 
specification language can actually be used to capture certain 
properties; a weak formal specification language can only 
capture simple requirements. For example, the specification 
language known as Propositional Linear-time Temporal Logic 
(PLTL) is known to be star-free regular [11] and therefore 
cannot formally capture requirements that require a stronger 
formalism, such as requirements that require nontrivial 
counting. In addition PLTL cannot be used to capture 
requirements that contain real-time constraints. 
B. The program/implementation dimension 
The program/implementation dimension deals with the ease 
of the adaptation of a given real-life complex program to a 
specific FV&V technique.  In an ideal world we would use an 
existing program verbatim for our FV&V technique of choice. 
In reality however this is often not the case, and a program 
needs to be modified, truncated, or abstracted to be considered 
for FV&V. For example, a model checker such as SPIN [12] 
cannot be used verbatim on a non-trivial C, C++, or Java 
program; rather, such a program needs to go through a process 
of abstraction before it can be used for verification, and hence 
has a low program coverage and a high program cost in the 
program/implementation dimension.  
C. The verification dimension 
The verification dimension bridges the specification and 
implementation dimensions. Verification ensures that the 
software implementation conforms to the specification. The 
verification dimension represents the cost, effort, and 
effectiveness of verification. For example, it is generally 
accepted that manual (i.e., human-based) testing is costly, 
slow, and error prone. Hence, human-based testing will be 
represented as a point in the cuboid whose verification 
dimension highlights high-cost and low-coverage. 
IV. QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF FV&V 
TECHNIQUES FOR REACTIVE SYSTEM BEHAVIORS 
Let us illustrate the use of the tradeoff space with a 
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discussion of cost and coverage tradeoffs among three 
categories of FV&V techniques: theorem proving, non-
execution-based model checking, and execution-based model 
checking via the combination of runtime verification and 
automatic test generation. We choose these three categories of 
techniques because they are used in many hybrid methods. For 
example, the Software Cost Reduction (SRC) Toolset [13] 
allows the user to enter the required externally visible 
behavior of a software system using a tabular notation, and 
then translates the SRC specification either into Promela [14], 
a Process Meta Language of the SPIN model checker, for 
model checking, or into TAME (Timed Automata Modeling 
Environment) [15], a specialized interface to PVS (Prototype 
Verification System) [16], for theorem proving. Other tools 
offer translations of Z [17] specifications to PVS [18], 
Isabelle/HOL [19], EVES [20], or SAL [21] for theorem 
proving or modeling checking. 
The coverage cuboid, shown in Figure 1, represents the 
coverage-space tradeoff between three FV&V techniques. 
Each point in the solid represents the extent of coverage in the 
three dimensions (specification, verification and 
implementation) provided by a given FV&V technique. 
Hence, an FV&V technique with high coverage (e.g., high 
specification coverage) is better in that aspect than a technique 
with low coverage.  
Figure 2 is the cost cuboid; it represents the cost-space 
tradeoff between the three FV&V techniques. Each point in 
the solid represents the cost in each dimension induced by a 
given FV&V technique. Clearly, an FV&V technique with 
high cost along some axis (e.g., high verification cost) is 
worse in that aspect than a technique with a low cost. 
 
 
A. Theorem Proving 
As its name suggests, Theorem Proving (TP) is a formal 
verification technique that uses mathematical proof techniques 
to make a convincing argument that a program conforms to a 
formal requirement. FV&V TP tools require a human driver 
because the underlying problem to be solved is typically 
undecidable. In addition, the choice of the specification 
language affects the skill level required by the driver. For 
example, ACL2 [22] uses Propositional-Logic (PL) 
specification that uses Lisp programming style notation for 
specification, whereas STeP (the Stanford Temporal Prover) 
[23] uses Propositional Linear-time Temporal Logic (PLTL) 
for specification [24], a language that requires more user 
expertise than PL. HOL theorem provers [25] are a family of 
interactive theorem proving systems that use higher order 
logic, which is theoretically more descriptive than PLTL but is 
arguably harder to use when it comes to specification of 
reactive system requirements. Examples of HOL TPs include 
the NQTHM [26], HOL4 [25], Isabelle [27], ProofPower [28] 
and PVS [16], as well as several efforts to embed temporal 
logic in HOL [29]-[32]. There are also a number of formal 
methods (e.g. methods using Floyd-Hoare Logic [33]-[35] and 
methods using the Type systems [36]) for the verification of 
target code via TP during the code-development phase. In the 
Floyd-Hoare Logic methods, every programming step has a 
pre-condition, post-condition and an invariant. The verifier is 
expected to use a proof system to check that the post condition 
follows from the precondition while the invariant is valid. In 
the Type systems methods, V&V can be moved to the design 
stage by formally stating the requirements in constructive 
logic. The software engineer then acts as a mathematician and 
proves that the requirement is a theorem that follows from the 
domain axioms. The system then extracts the code 
automatically from this proof. Therefore the generated code 
now automatically becomes correct, as the software engineer 
indirectly proved it to be so. 
1) The specification/validation dimension of TP 
This dimension is affected by the expressive power and 
ease of use of the formal specification languages used by TP 
tools.  In general, the more automated the theorem prover, the 




























Fig. 1.  The coverage space 
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provers have rather weak specification languages - mostly 
based on some form of temporal logic. Such languages are 
also considered hard to use because they are considerably 
different than the languages used by programmers for whom a 
common practice is to model and program using UML-based 
visual languages. It is difficult for system designers who have 
a limited knowledge of formal logic to visualize the subtle 
meaning of temporal logic statements in order to validate the 
correctness of the formal specifications.  Consequently, we 
ranked TP techniques as having low specification coverage 
and high specification cost. 
2) The program/implementation dimension of TP 
TP techniques rely on special programming languages 
tailored specifically for the TP process. Consequently, it is not 
possible to perform TP on an existing Java or C++ application 
verbatim, i.e., an existing complex application needs to be first 
translated into a new representation using the TP tool’s 
language of choice. In most safety-critical application, such as 
NASA flight-code, or complex defense applications (e.g., the 
AEGIS weapon system), the new representation will not cover 
all aspects of the original program; for example, STeP does 
not have nearly the same library support as Java or C++. 
Consequently, we ranked TP techniques as having low 
program coverage and high program cost. 
3) The verification dimension of TP 
As discussed above, TP is never automatic, and requires a 
high level of expertise on the part of the user in automated 
reasoning. Even with such expertise, it is not guaranteed that 
the human driver will be able to navigate the TP process (e.g., 
selecting the inference rules or managing the set of support 
axioms) to completion. Nevertheless, when the process does 
complete it provides 100% coverage, that is, no more testing 
is required for that specific requirement. Hence, we ranked TP 
techniques as having good verification coverage but high 
verification cost. 
B. Model Checking 
Classical, or non-execution-based, Model Checking (MC) is 
an algorithmic formal verification technique. MC is a push-
button verification technique in that once a program is set-up 
for MC and a property (e.g., reachability, safety, liveness, and 
fairness) is formally captured using the formal specification 
language of choice, the process does not require an expert 
human driver.  
1) The specification/validation dimension of MC 
Contemporary MC techniques are limited in the 
specification dimension. For example, SPIN [12] uses PLTL 
or Büchi-automata [37] for requirement specification, 
resulting is the similar specification coverage and cost 
limitations as TP techniques. Kronos [38] and Uppall [39], on 
the other hand, use timed automata to verify real-time 
properties specified in computation tree logic (CTL) [40]. 
Both CTL and PLTL are rather weak subsets of full branching 
time logic (CTL*) [41]. Both CTL and CTL* use path 
operators, making it challenging to formulate correct 
specifications.  Like the formal specifications in the TP 
techniques, specifications for the MC techniques are text-
based and difficult to visualize and validate by system 
designers. Unlike TP, MC does not require the detailed 
assertions (e.g. invariants) to help guide the intermediate steps 
of the proof processes. Hence, we rank MC as having low 
specification coverage, yet with a specification cost somewhat 
lower than that assigned to the TP category.  
2) The program/implementation dimension of MC 
Model checking’s Achilles heel is typically considered to 
be the state-space explosion problem, where the size of the 
problem space as seen by the MC grows exponentially as the 
program under verification grows. Consequently, MC is 
limited to finite-state components and is performance-
constrained by the number of states in that component. For 
example, a single 32-bit integer variable induces effectively 
232 states. For FV&V of large real-life systems there are two 
options available to MC users: (i) to ignore large parts of the 
system using a process known as abstraction [42], where MC 
is performed on a small abstract model of the original system, 
or (ii) to carve out limited, small, parts of the system and 
perform MC only on those parts. In either case there is a non-
trivial effort involved. In addition, the artifact that is 
eventually model-checked differs significantly from the 
original system, being either an abstract version or limited 
portion of the original system. We therefore rank MC as 
having low program coverage and high program cost. 
3) The verification dimension of MC 
The premise of MC is automatic, “push-button”, 
verification with no special driver required. Also, MC results 
in 100% verification coverage of the component being 
verified (for components small enough to allow MC to 
complete without running into the state explosion problem). 
Hence, we rank MC as having high verification coverage and 
low verification cost. 
C. Execution-based Model Checking 
Runtime Verification (RV) involves monitoring the runtime 
execution of a system and checking the observed runtime 
behavior against the system’s formal specification. Hence, RV 
behaves as an automated observer of the program’s behavior 
and compares that behavior with the expected behavior per the 
formal specification.  
Some published RV tools are the TemporalRover/DBRover 
[43], PaX[44] and RT-Mac [45], all of which use extensions 
and variants of PLTL as the specification language of choice, 
and the StateRover [46] that uses deterministic and non-
deterministic statechart diagrams as its specification language.  
Execution-based Model Checking (EMC) is a combination 
of RV and Automatic Test Generation (ATG). With EMC, a 
large volume of automatically generated tests are used to 
exercise the program or system under test (SUT), using RV on 
the other end to check the SUT’s conformance to the formal 
specification. 
Some ATG tools that, when combined with RV tools, 
create an EMC technique are the StateRover’s white-box 
automatic test-generator [47] and NASA’s Java Path Finder 




1) The specification/validation dimension of EMC  
Although some early RV tools have used limited 
specification languages such as PLTL [24] and MTL [49], 
there is nothing inherent in the ATG, RV, and EMC 
techniques that limit the specification language.  Indeed, the 
StateRover’s specification language is Turing equivalent. In 
contrast, no specification language for MC or TP is Turing 
equivalent. In addition, the current state-of-practice considers 
UML diagrams as an easy-to-use modeling and specification 
language, rendering UML-based formal specification less 
costly to create and more powerful than specification 
languages used by MC and TP techniques. The availability of 
executable code for the formal assertions allows system 
designers to test specifications (via scenario simulation) 
independent of the prototype design, ensuring that the system 
designers truly understand the required system behavior 
without being tainted by any pre-conceived solutions [50].  
Hence, we rank EMC as having high specification coverage 
and low specification cost.   
2) The program/application dimension of EMC 
The premise of RV is that it can be used for FV&V of any 
existing, almost unmodified Java, C, or C++ system, 
regardless of its size and complexity. This is true up to the 
insertion of instrumentation code. We therefore rank EMC as 
having high program coverage and low program cost. 
3) The verification dimension of EMC 
EMC is an execution-based FV&V method, where the 
system under test and the specification execute in tandem. 
Consequently, there is always a possibility that the ATG did 
not generate a test sequence that violates a requirement. Hence 
EMC’s verification coverage cannot be 100% and we 
therefore rank EMC as having lower verification coverage 
than MC or TP. Depending on the level of automation of the 
test-generator, EMC is fully or partially automatic. EMC has a 
low verification cost when using an automatic ATG tool. 
V. SAMPLE APPLICATION OF THE TRADEOFF SPACE 
In 1993, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) established an IV&V facility in the 
wake of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident as part of a 
plan “to provide the highest achievable levels of safety and 
cost-effectiveness for mission critical software” [51]. The 
facility has continuously developed their IV&V program, 
incorporating new technologies and better verification and 
validation techniques in an effort to improve the V&V 
process. Earlier versions of the V&V process relied on manual 
examination and independent testing of target code. These 
techniques are ineffective for use in validation because there 
is no provision in the process to validate the developer’s 
correct understanding of the requirements as manifested by 
the system’s features, capabilities, properties and functions. 
Moreover, the processes were unable to locate the subtle 
errors in increasingly complex software-intensive systems. 
Hence, the IV&V Facility is transitioning from using manual 
V&V processes to utilizing highly automated processes 
involving the application of advanced computer-aided V&V 
techniques. In 2007, the facility adopted a System Reference 
Model (SRM) framework that allows the IV&V teams to 
capture their own understanding of the problem and the 
expected behavior of any proposed system for solving the 
problem via executable formal assertions of mission- and 
safety-critical behaviors [52]. In particular, the facility was 
looking for formal techniques that can capture and validate 
sequencing behaviors with timing and time-series constraints.  
After comparing the capabilities and costs among the three 
major FV&V approaches (TP, MC and EMC), the NASA 
IV&V Facility selected the EMC approach and chose to 
specify the mission- and safety-critical behaviors in terms of 
Statechart assertions for the following reasons: 
1) As shown in the Specification dimension of the Coverage 
Space (Figure 1), it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
specify sequencing behaviors with timing and time-series 
constraints using PLTL. 
2) The IV&V teams found that Statechart assertions are 
easier to create and understand than the text-based PLTL 
assertions, as shown in the Specification dimension of the 
Cost Space (Figure 2). In addition, the IV&V teams can 
execute the formal assertions to validate their 
understanding of the expected behavior of any eventual 
system implementation without being tainted by the 
developer’s agenda. 
3) Since the IV&V Facility is often limited in its ability to 
perform detailed analyses of developer’s code, they will 
need to rely on black-box testing to verify the correctness 
of the developer’s systems.  As shown in the 
Implementation dimension of the Coverage Space (Figure 
1) and the Implementation and the Verification 
dimensions of the Cost Space (Figure 2), EMC provides 
superior coverage while being the least costly amongst 
the three FV&V techniques. 
4) The limited test coverage of the EMC approach, as shown 
in the Verification dimension of the Coverage Space 
(Figure 1), does increase the risk of not being able to 
uncover errors in the delivered system. However, the 
impact of such risk to the IV&V effort is less significant 
than it is to the developer’s V&V effort, since the IV&V 
teams only act as a second line of defense in the overall 
NASA safety and mission assurance program.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly, as visually depicted by Figures 1 and 2, we have 
identified a tradeoff space associated with FV&V. It follows 
from an analysis of this space that an organization may need 
to determine how to best allocate its limited V&V resources. 
For example, an organization that chooses TP or MC is 
effectively deciding in favor of good verification yet for a 
restricted set of behavioral (reactive) requirements, since 
many behavioral requirements of interest cannot be addressed 
by TP or MC. In addition, a choice of MC will limit the size 
or level of abstraction of the application being verified. EMC 
on the other hand, when compared with MC and TP, has 
superior specification coverage and cost as well as superior 
program coverage and cost, but inferior verification coverage. 
Consequently, one can conclude from Figures 1 and 2 that 
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the option boils down to a choice between:  
1) Thoroughly verifying a limited application against a 
limited set of requirements with a high upfront cost of 
specification-development and program-adaptation; 
2) Partially verifying an entire application as-is, against a 
wide set of real-life requirements. 
This choice might also help explain the lackluster 
acceptance of FV&V techniques by the industry. In the past, 
MC and TP have been the prominent available FV&V 
techniques, forcing the marketplace to fund verification of 
limited or abstracted components against limited, often seen as 
over simplified, requirements: This is not in our opinion a 
good investment.  
Studies of software failures typically point to the 
importance of correct requirements and the difficulties in 
getting the correct description of these requirements. One 
must start with the correct requirements specifications. 
Otherwise, it does not matter how effective and efficient a 
verification technique is, it becomes an exercise in futility to 
formally verify that a system conforms to invalid requirements 
(i.e., that we built the wrong system correctly). Hence, it is 
important to select the FV&V techniques that are both cost-
effective and coverage-effective in the specification/validation 
dimension. 
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